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_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-02-cr-00673-005) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
_____________ 
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September 19, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, RENDELL and  
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed September 21, 2012) 
_____________ 
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Cherry Hill, NJ  08002 
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Mark E. Coyne, Esq. 
Office of United States Attorney 
970 Broad Street, Room 700 
Newark, NJ  07102 
    Counsel for Appellee                 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Dwight Turlington appeals the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence imposed for his having violated 
the terms of his supervised release.  Turlington contends that 
the District Court erred in sentencing him to a term of five 
years’ imprisonment.  He also challenges the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm. 
A. 
 In 2002, Turlington pled guilty to conspiring to 
distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846.  In 2004, 
the District Court sentenced Turlington to eighty-four 
months’ imprisonment and sixty months’ supervised release.  
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His sentence was less than one-third of that recommended by 
the Sentencing Guidelines.   
 On October 29, 2008, Turlington began his term of 
supervised release.  On September 6, 2009, Turlington was 
charged with driving under the influence in New Jersey.  
Then, on December 7, 2009, New Jersey state police 
observed Turlington engaging in three hand-to-hand drug 
transactions.  When the police approached Turlington and 
announced themselves, he attempted to flee.  During flight, 
Turlington threw a loaded handgun to the ground.  The state 
police eventually placed Turlington under arrest.  They 
searched Turlington and found $245 in cash and a plastic bag 
of cocaine.  Turlington pleaded guilty to a state charge of 
possessing a weapon while committing a controlled 
dangerous substance crime.  The New Jersey Superior Court 
sentenced Turlington to three years’ imprisonment for that 
offense, to run concurrently with any other federal sentence. 
 As a condition of his supervised release, Turlington 
was prohibited from committing another federal, state or local 
crime.  He was also prohibited from possessing a firearm or 
destructive device.  On May 26, 2011, the District Court held 
a revocation of supervised release hearing.  At the hearing, 
Turlington admitted to possessing the handgun and drugs.  
The District Court revoked Turlington’s term of supervised 
release and sentenced him to a sixty-month prison term.  
Turlington filed a timely appeal.
1
 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 
237 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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B. 
  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), a district court 
may revoke a term of supervised release and “require the 
defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of 
supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 
resulted in such term of supervised release” provided that 
a defendant whose term is revoked under this 
paragraph may not be required to serve on any 
such revocation more than 5 years in prison if 
the offense that resulted in the term of 
supervised release is a class A felony, [or] more 
than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class 
B felony . . . . 
In other words, a district court may impose up to a five-year 
term of imprisonment after revoking supervised release where 
the underlying offense is a class A felony.  Where the 
underlying offense is a class B felony, a district court may 
only sentence the defendant to a maximum of three years’ 
imprisonment.   
The crime for which Turlington was convicted was 
considered a class A felony at the time he was originally 
sentenced.  However, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) 
reduced penalties for crack cocaine offenses so that, at the 
time of his revocation hearing, the underlying offense was 
classified as a class B felony.  As such, he contends that the 
District Court should have sentenced him to no more than 
three years’ imprisonment.  Turlington did not make this 
argument to the District Court; therefore, we review his 
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challenge to the sentence for plain error.  United States v. 
Lewis, 660 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2011).
2
   
We hold that the District Court was correct to sentence 
Turlington based on the original classification of the 
underlying offense as a class A felony.  In Johnson v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000), the Supreme Court made 
clear that imposition of a new sentence for violating the terms 
of one’s supervised release is part and parcel of the first 
offense for which the defendant was convicted.  The Court 
reasoned that “postrevocation penalties relate to the original 
offense,” and instructed lower courts to “attribute 
postrevocation penalties to the original conviction.”  Id. at 
701.   
The Supreme Court’s decision in McNeill v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011) supports our holding.  In that 
case, the Court ruled that, when determining whether an 
offense is a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (ACCA), ACCA “requires a federal sentencing 
court to consult the maximum sentence applicable to a 
defendant’s previous drug offense at the time of his 
conviction for that offense. . . . The only way to answer this 
backward-looking question is to consult the law that applied 
at the time of that conviction.”  Id. at 2221-22 (emphasis 
added).  The Court continued that whether an offense is a 
                                              
2
 Plain error review requires us to first determine whether the 
District Court committed an error that is plain.  Second, we 
ask whether that error affected the defendant’s substantial 
rights.  Third, we must decide whether to exercise our 
discretion to correct that error, provided that the error 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.  Lewis, 660 F.3d at 192 n.2. 
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serious drug offense “can only be answered by reference to 
the law under which the defendant was convicted.”  Id. at 
2222.   
The same reasoning applies here.  The length of a new 
term of imprisonment for violating supervised release—a 
penalty which is attributed to the original conviction 
according to Johnson—“can only be answered by reference to 
the law under which the defendant was convicted.”  McNeill, 
131 S. Ct. at 2222.  Section 3583(e)(3) is, like ACCA, 
backward-looking; it focuses on the previous, underlying 
conviction.  The statute provides that a district court may 
resentence a defendant “to serve in prison all or part of the 
term of supervised release authorized by statute for the 
offense that resulted in such term of supervised release.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added).  Thus, a district court 
must look to the underlying offense as it existed at the time of 
his original sentencing when making decisions authorized by 
§ 3583(e)(3).   
The Supreme Court’s recent decision on the FSA’s 
retroactivity does not change the result.  Dorsey v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) addresses only the applicability 
of the FSA to those defendants who were convicted of crack 
cocaine offenses prior to the FSA’s effective date of August 
3, 2010, but were sentenced after that date.  It does not 
address, or disturb, the basic principle that the FSA does not 
apply to those defendants who were both convicted and 
sentenced prior to the effective date of the FSA.  See United 
States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the FSA is not retroactive to individuals convicted and 
sentenced prior to the FSA’s effective date).  Thus, 
Turlington is incorrect to analogize his situation to that 
confronted in Dorsey.  He is not like those defendants who 
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are convicted of the crack offense prior to the FSA effective 
date, but sentenced after the effective date.  He was both 
convicted and sentenced prior to the FSA’s effective date.  
The fact that his supervised release was revoked after passage 
of the FSA is of no moment. 
In sum, because, according to Johnson, the revocation 
of supervised release and imposition of the term of 
imprisonment relates back to the underlying conviction, and 
because McNeill persuades us that, like ACCA, § 3583(e)(3) 
is a backward-looking statute, we reject Turlington’s 
argument that the District Court should have sentenced him as 
if his underlying offense were a class B felony.  Therefore, 
the District Court did not plainly err in sentencing Turlington 
to five years’ imprisonment, a term which was clearly 
authorized by § 3583(e)(3). 
Turlington also challenges the substantive 
reasonableness of his sentence, which we review for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  Section 3583(e) requires district courts to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors when sentencing defendants 
upon the revocation of supervised release.  Turlington 
contends that the District Court did not meaningfully consider 
certain mitigating factors such as his guilty plea, his 
cooperation with state and federal authorities, the fact that he 
received only a three-year sentence for his state convictions, 
and his efforts at rehabilitation.  After reviewing the record, 
we find that the District Court did, however, meaningfully 
consider these factors when arriving at the five-year term of 
imprisonment.   
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C. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
